In their Insensitive Semantics (2005) Cappelen and Lepore argue for the Controversial Aspect (CA) which is a part of their Speech Act Pluralism and which says that speakers don't have privileged access to what they say. Gross (2006) criticizes C&L's argument for CA and urges them to abandon that claim. I argue that on C&L's broad understanding of the notion of what is said, CA (and whole SAP) is trivial, whereas on a more restricted understanding CA is indeed controversial and plausibly false. Moreover, the broad reading of what is said is incompatible with one of C&L's tests for context-sensitivity.
Introduction
In their Insensitive Semantics (2005) Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore argue for semantic minimalism and against both moderate and radical contextualism. They argue that radical contextualism is internally inconsistent and moderate contextualism is not much better since it leads directly to the radical version. Their semantic minimalism is the view that the semantic content of the sentence S is the content that all utterances of S share (the so-called minimal proposition). Minimal proposition depends on context only when the sentence contains indexical expressions, which are -according to them -very few and far between (roughly those from Kaplan's list 1 ). Otherwise it is contextinsensitive. 2 The sentence "Rudolf has a red nose" expresses the minimal proposition that Rudolf has a red nose independently of the context in which it is uttered; the sentence "Rudolf has had breakfast" expresses the minimal proposition that Rudolf has had breakfast, the sentence "Rudolf is ready" expresses the minimal proposition that Rudolf is ready, and so on. 3 Cappelen and Lepore admit that the proposition semantically expressed by an utterance u of a sentence S does not exhaust the speech act content of u (2005: 145) . Hence, with semantic minimalism comes speech act pluralism. Stephen Gross (2006) distinguishes two central claims in speech act pluralism: Basic Pluralism, which says that speech act content includes an indefinite number of propositions and the Controversial Aspect which is the claim that speakers do not have privileged access to what they say and do not even have to believe what they sincerely say. The evidence for the truth of both these claims is indefinite range of true and accurate indirect speech reports concerning a particular utterance. Gross argues that the Controversial Aspect is very controversial indeed and that Cappelen and Lepore would be better off without it.
Gross considers the following situation (2006: 12) . A utters "Julia went to the Whole Foods". According to Cappelen and Lepore A's utterance may be reported in many various ways (depending on contexts). For instance, B might say (i) "A said that Julia went to the Whole Foods", (ii) "A said that Julia went to the supermarket", (iii) "A said that Julia's getting the chips", (iv) "A said that Julia will be gone for a bit".
If B and C know of Julia that she is Ann's younger daughter and B knows that C doesn't know that that girl's name is "Julia" B may report A's utterance to C by saying Gross argues that Cappelen and Lepore's implicit argument for the Controversial Aspect is "something like the following principle" (Gross 2006: 13) : if (1) A utters 'P', (2) B utters about A's utterance 'A said that Q', and (3) speakers judge what B said accurate, then the proposition semantically expressed by 'Q' is part of the speech act content of A's utterance.
Gross argues further that (3) -as stated -is ambiguous, because it is unclear whether what the speakers judge is the accuracy of the semantic content or the speech act content of B's report. If this argument is to be an argument for the Controversial Aspect it must be the semantic content that is relevant (for if the speakers judge the speech act content then this has no direct bearing on the proposition semantically expressed by 'Q' being or not being part of the speech act content of A's utterance). However, Gross notices that there is no reason to expect -and certainly Cappelen and Lepore should not expect 4 -that speakers are good judges of the accuracy of the proposition semantically expressed by an indirect report. In this version it is unproblematic that "what B said" in (3) refers to the speech act content of B's report.
It has to be noted that this version of the principle is very week. First of all, it concerns the relation between contents of two speech acts and amounts to the claim that A's speech act and B's speech act share part of their content. Since according to Basic Pluralism speech act content includes an indefinite number of propositions the principle is not very revealing. Moreover, it does not deal with semantic content any more, so it does not say anything about "saying" as distinct from e.g. "implying", "implicating", etc. Therefore, in this version the principle cannot be used as an argument for the Controversial Aspect. The notion of saying to which it appeals is so broad that the Controversial Aspect based on it would not be controversial anymore. If we assume that by saying that p I also say, e.g., all logical consequences of p, then obviously I do not have a privileged access to what I say. It is equally obvious however that we do not use "say that" in that way. Moreover, the principle in its new version still does not allow us to treat cases such as the following (see Gross 2006: 17) . Imagine that B has reported A's utterance as (v) . In such a situation Ann may complain to A that she betrayed her, because she revealed that Ann has a daughter (whom she had given up for adoption).
Thus, instead of clarifying the relation between saying and accurate indirect speech reports, the principle muddles things up. Cappelen and Lepore argue against distinguishing different meanings of "saying that" and claim that they don't see how to elicit intuitions about what-is-said by an utterance of a sentence without appealing to intuitions about the accuracy of indirect reports of the form 'He said that….' 'What he said is that … '(1998: 280) .
It seems to me that we have two options here:
1. Interpret "what is said" pragmatically and identify it with the speech act content. Then it will be the case that accurate indirect reports are good guides to speech act content. However, on such an interpretation of "what is said" the controversial aspect (together with Basic Pluralism and whole Speech Act Pluralism) turns out to be trivial. 2. Interpret "what is said" semantically and identify it with the semantic content. But then even accurate indirect reports are bad guides to what is said. The Controversial Aspect is very controversial indeed (not to say false).
Pragmatic and semantic "what is said"
Let us consider the pragmatic option first. As we can see the first report considerably shortens the original utterance, the second replaces the name of the colour with a demonostrative description, the third reportee reports conversational implicature as what was said while the fourth changes the original utterance in such a way as to make it true. Lepore argues that all of these reports are, at least in some contexts, accurate indirect reports. Thus, it may be the case that although it is correct to say that the speaker said that p, p is not the semantic content of his utterance. 5 Since according to Cappelen and Lepore the accurate indirect reports from the utterance U establish what was said by U, they are forced to reject 'Original Utterance Centrism' as a result. They claim that "said that" is a four-place relation between the utterance, its context, the report and its context. Thus, in some contexts, the reporter and his context are as important for determining what was said as the original utterer and his context. If so, then it becomes obvious that the speaker may not know what he said: the hearer is as much of an authority on what was said as the speaker is. 5 Cappelen and Lepore argue that the reverse correlation also doesn't hold. It is not always the case that if p is the semantic content of N's utterance, then one can say that N said that p. Let's assume that N said "12 is a dozen". "12 is a dozen" expresses the same proposition as "12 is 12". One cannot say however, that N said that "12 is 12" (cf. Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 286) . It seems that the only way to reject this is to argue that sentences which differ only in purely referential expressions may express different propositions (i.e. may have different semantic content).
Let us turn to the second -semantic -option now. There is no denying that the notion of what is said is unclear. In particular it is controversial whether it is a part of the literal meaning or a part of the speaker meaning. However, it seems to me that we gain nothing by abandoning the distinction between what was said and what was communicated altogether. Broadening the notion of what is said in such a way that it encompasses what was implicated does not solve anything. On the contrary, it makes things worse, for it makes impossible for speakers to deny that they have said something. If hearers judge the indirect speech report as accurate the original speaker has no way to object. For instance, in the situation (v) envisaged above A cannot defend herself against Anne's charge that she's revealed Ann's long hidden secret. In addition, speakers' intuitions concerning accuracy of the report are not always a reliable guide. We may imagine that speakers who first judged B's report (v) accurate, later -i.e. after Anne's accusationwould agree with A that she didn't say that Anne's younger daughter went to the supermarket. There is no denying that 'said that' is vague and ambiguous in natural language. It seems to me that there are at least four distinct ways in which one may attempt to report someone else's speech indirectly. In the situation described above: In the last three cases B's utterance is not a mere report; he makes his own contribution. In (2) B reports how he understood A. In (3) and (4) B tries to facilitate the understanding of what A said/communicated. In all three cases A may object to B's report even though the audience judges the report accurate. In the first case B's utterance "A said that Q" means precisely "A said that Q". In the second case it means roughly "from what A said I (i.e. B) understood that Q". In the third case B means "what A said can be best conveyed to you as Q". In the fourth case B says in fact: "what A meant can be best conveyed to you as Q". In the cases (2) -(4) B's report is not so much a report on what A said but rather it is a self-report on how B understood what A said and/or how he think it is best to convey it to others. In this sense what A actually said only partially determines what B may accurately report. The other part is B's own contribution, for which he may be held responsible. If we keep all these different meanings of "said that" separate, then it is easier to deal with the tricky cases. In particular it allows A to reject the charge that she revealed something that was merely implicated by what she said but was fully revealed by B's report. Moreover, it becomes clear that the Controversial Aspect is not only controversial but false for some of the meanings of "what is said".
Conclusion
The question "What did A say?" is often a question concerning not the exact words uttered by A, but implicatures, intended meaning of A's utterance, etc. Equally often it might be a question of clarification. From this observation Cappelen and Lepore derive the conclusion that indirect speech reports have to take into account certain non-semantic features of the reported utterance and features of the context of the report itself (see 1997: 291) . Lepore (2004: 67) concludes: "what happens to our words with their fixed meanings once they leave our mouths is often beyond our control".
It concern what is asserted. The thesis that we are not responsible for what we say in the broad sense is controversial at the first glance, but once we realize that what is said is constituted by the hearer as well as by the speaker, then it will become obvious that the speaker is not always responsible for what he said. Moreover, sometimes the responsible one will be the reportee. The title of Gross's paper is phrased as a question "Can one sincerely say what one doesn't believe?". If we assume the broad understanding, then this question cannot even be asked, because one cannot sensibly ask whether what A said in the broad sense was sincere.
In addition, the whole Speech Act Pluralism becomes evident for its second component -basic pluralism -is also, just like the Controversial Aspect, a trivial thesis.
It is also worth mentioning that broad understanding of "what is said" is incompatible with a "says-that" test for context-sensitivity invented by Cappelen and Lepore. As it was mentioned at the beginning Cappelen and Lepore think that there are only few indexical expressions in natural language. "Now", "here", "I", "he" and the like are context-sensitive, but the rest do not depend on context. They have invented three tests 7 which are suppose to determine 8 which expressions are context sensitive. One of those tests concerns intercontextual disquotational indirect reports. It is argued that context-sensitive expressions block such reports: they cannot be correctly reported disquotationally across contexts. Imagine that A says "I'm hungry now". B reports A's utterance by saying immediately after: A said that I'm hungry now. Clearly such a report is incorrect. This is supposed to indicate that "I" is context-sensitive. Now take the example of "ready", which is an expression that is thought by contextualists to be context-sensitive. In the context in which preparations for an exam are being discussed A says "John is ready". In another context, in which preparations for going on holiday are discussed, B reports A's utterance by saying: A said that John is ready. Cappelen and Lepore claim that such report is correct and hence "ready" is not context-sensitive. It is clear however that their claim is plausible only if we assume minimal understanding of what is said. Only than can we claim that B is right in saying that A said that John is ready. If "what is said" is understood in a broader way, then B won't be entitled to report A's utterance just by saying "A said that John is ready", for in B's context -on a broad understanding of "what is said" -such a report would mean "A said that John is ready to go for holiday".
